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Abstract
There is strong evidence that on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities trade much
more liquidly and at signiﬁcantly higher prices than their oﬀ-the-run counterparts.
We examine if the same phenomenon is present in the German government bond
market whose market structure diﬀer markedly from that of the U.S. Treasury
market. In sharp contrast to the U.S. evidence, we ﬁnd that on-the-run status
has only a negligible eﬀect on the liquidity and pricing once other factors have
been controlled for. Instead, the highly liquid German bond futures market, whose
turnover is many times larger than in the cash market, leads to signiﬁcant liquidity
spillovers. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that bonds which are deliverable into futures con-
tracts are both trading more liquidly and commanding a signiﬁcant price premium,
and that this eﬀect became more pronounced during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Keywords: Government bond, liquidity, liquidity premium, futures market
JEL Classiﬁcation: E43, G12, H635
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Non-technical summary 
Variations in liquidity are one reason why yields on otherwise comparable 
government securities differ. Although the liquidity of a bond can be measured in 
several ways, the concept essentially captures to what extent the bond can be sold 
cheaply and easily. Liquidity is thus valuable for market participants, and especially 
in times of market stress, the most liquid bonds have tended to command a 
considerable price premium. 
Liquidity can have important implications for bond yields and the term structure of 
interest rates.  Previous studies of liquidity and liquidity premia in government bond 
markets, based mainly on data from the U.S. Treasury market, have identified 
pronounced liquidity differences across government securities. In particular, the most 
recently issued securities in a given maturity bracket, the so-called on-the-run issues, 
have been found to trade much more actively and liquidly than their more seasoned 
counterparts. It has also been found that these differences in liquidity between on-the-
run and off-the-run securities have important implications for bond pricing.  
To contribute to a better understanding of the underlying determinants of liquidity and 
liquidity premia, this paper reports on a study of the German government bond 
market. Such a study is useful particularly because the German and U.S. markets for 
trading interest rate risk differ considerably. In particular, in contrast to the U.S. 
market, turnover in the German bond futures market is many times larger than in the 
German cash bond market. We argue that this difference causes trading to be less 
concentrated on specific bonds in the German market, which, in turn, helps explain 
why differences in liquidity premia are considerably smaller. 
Our empirical results clearly suggest that the existence of a highly liquid German 
futures market leads to significant liquidity spillovers to the German cash market. 
Specifically, we find that bonds which are deliverable into the futures contracts are 
both trading more liquidly and commanding a price premium. Moreover, we show 
that this effect has intensified during the recent financial crisis. In sharp contrast to the 
evidence from the U.S. Treasury market, on-the-run status appears to have only a 
modest effect on the liquidity and pricing of German government bonds once other 
factors have been controlled for. 6
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1 Introduction
Previous studies of liquidity and liquidity premia in government bond markets, based
predominantly on data from the U.S. Treasury market, have identiﬁed pronounced
liquidity diﬀerences across government securities. In particular, the most recently issued
securities in a given maturity bracket, the so-called on-the-run issues, have been found
to trade much more actively and liquidly than their more seasoned counterparts. This
pattern is usually referred to as the ‘on-the-run liquidity phenomenon’. It has also been
found that these diﬀerences in liquidity between on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run securities
have important implications for bond pricing, and that - particularly in times of market
stress - the on-the-run securities command a signiﬁcant price premium. For example,
the yield discount on the on-the-run ten-year U.S. Treasury note relative to older issues
with similar remaining maturity reached over 50 basis points in the autumn of 2008.
With a view to better understand the underlying causes of liquidity and liquidity
premia, an examination of the German government bond market can potentially provide
new insights. Speciﬁcally, the market structures of the U.S. and German government
bond markets diﬀer considerably; most notably with regard to the relative sizes of
cash and futures markets. Table 1 compares U.S. and German trading volumes in
government securities (excluding bills) and corresponding futures contracts. Whereas
trading volumes in the German cash bond market is dwarfed by the activity in US
Treasury market, the trading volumes in the two futures markets are of the same order
of magnitude. This has important implications: whereas benchmark status and on-
the-run status are synonymous in the U.S. Treasury market, in the German market,
the benchmark status is de facto shared between a number of bonds, namely those
bonds which are deliverable into the nearest-to-expiry futures contracts. Figures 1a
and 1b show an example of how these diﬀerences aﬀect trading volumes throughout the
lives of selected ten-year bonds maturing around 2010. The U.S. ‘on-the-run liquidity
phenomenon’ is clearly reﬂected in the sharp drop-oﬀ in traded volumes after the on-
the-run period (top panel). For the German bonds (middle panel), however, the initial7
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decline is much less pronounced, and there is a strong resurgence of trading as the
bonds become deliverable again for the ﬁve-year futures and (albeit to a lesser extent)
for the two-year futures.
Table 1: German and US markets for government securities and related futures (2008)
Amount outstanding Total volume 2008 Relative size of
(EURa billion) (EUR billion) futures market
Cash market Futures in %
Germany 879 5961 58715 985%
United States 2302 81426 45748 56%
Sources: Eurex, Bundesrepublik Deutschland Finanzagentur,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Chicago Board of Trade and the US Treasury Department.
aUS dollar amounts were converted using the average exchange rate of 2008, 1.4711 USD per EUR.
In this paper, we ask whether the extremely large German futures market (relatively
to the cash market) gives rise to signiﬁcant liquidity spillovers to the cash bond market.
In particular, we examine whether deliverable bonds systematically enjoy enhanced
liquidity (as measured by higher trading volumes, higher quoted depths and/or tighter
bid-ask spreads). Moreover, we investigate whether such liquidity eﬀects are reﬂected
in the prices of German government bonds. There are two main reasons for expecting
spillover eﬀects. First, deliverable bonds are easier to hedge using futures contracts, and
thus more attractive for dealers (and other market participants with short horizons)
to hold. Second, trading of deliverable bonds is directly supported by the strategies of
arbitrageurs and speculative investors targeting the bond-future basis.
Our empirical results demonstrate that deliverability into futures contracts - rather
than on-the-run status - is the key driver of liquidity and liquidity premia in the German
market once other relevant factors have been controlled for. The sizes of the liquidity
premia in the German market are found to be much smaller than those previously
reported for U.S. on-the-run securities. This is consistent with the more ambiguous8
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(a) United States































Figure 1: Monthly averages of daily trading volumes (EUR billion, on y-axes) as a
function of time-to-maturity (years, on x-axis) for nine 10-year governments bonds. On-
the-run and deliverability periods are shaded in darker and lighter colors, respectively.
Source: ICMA.
notion of benchmark status in the German market, which diﬀuses short-horizon trading
over a larger set of bonds. We ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect of deliverability has intensiﬁed
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis, probably reﬂecting that the ability to hedge positions
has become even more important amid unusually high volatility.
Our contributions relative to the existing literature on liquidity premia in govern-
ment bond markets are fourfold. First, we pay closer attention to a key feature of
German government bonds, namely their deliverability into extremely liquid futures
contracts such as the Euro-Bund future. We ﬁnd that this feature, which has been9
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largely neglected in most previous studies on euro area bond market liquidity, is key to
explaining relative pricing along and vis-` a-vis the German yield curve. Our emphasis
on market structure also helps explaining the remarkable diﬀerences in liquidity premia
found between the U.S. Treasury market and other government bond markets.
Second, in contrast to most previous studies conducted on euro area data, which
typically have aimed at explaining levels of and variations in sovereign spreads, we take
a single-issuer perspective and focus on Germany, the bellwether market for euro-area
bond yields. This approach permits a richer cross-sectional analysis, simultaneously
considering liquidity and liquidity premia for all outstanding bonds, and allows us to
separately identify the eﬀects of deliverability, on-the-run status and other liquidity
determinants. Such identiﬁcation could not have been achieved with the typical ap-
proach of comparing, say, ten-year benchmark yields across countries. As a control, we
replicate our results with French bonds, which are issued in amounts similar to those
of German bonds, but cannot be delivered into futures contracts.
Third, our empirical analysis is based on a very rich data set obtained from a Eu-
ropean electronic limit-order market, MTS, containing high quality intra-day measures
of liquidity (such as quoted depth and bid-ask spreads) for virtually all outstanding
German and French bonds (among other issuers). Our data set covers both the periods
before and after the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in mid-2007, which allows us to assess
whether the determinants of liquidity and liquidity premia changed across these very
diﬀerent market regimes. We use the high-frequency quote data to form robust mea-
sures of market liquidity, which are superior to the ’snapshot measures’ from a speciﬁc
time of the day often used in the existing literature on euro area bond market liquidity.
Fourth, since premia related to deliverability contort the German yield curve in
subtle ways, which cannot be captured with standard methods (such as the extended
Nelson-Siegel speciﬁcation), we use a ﬂexible approach to yield curve estimation. By
allowing for multiple (inverse) humps, our spline-based approach can accommodate the
peculiar features of the German yield curve arising from the identiﬁed liquidity spillovers10
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from the futures market. Figure 2 preempts the results of our curve estimation analysis.
The stars and the circles represent observed spot yields on French and German bonds on
a single day in 2008, plotted against their remaining maturity. The ﬁgure clearly reveals
pronounced inverse humps along the German term structure, which in time-to-maturity
terms coincide with the baskets of deliverable bonds for the futures contracts.1












Figure 2: Actual and ﬁtted spot rates for French and German bonds on 11 April 2008
(although plotted, the on-the-run securities are not included in the curve estimation).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the economics of the on-the-run phenomenon, including a brief literature review. The
third section presents our data set, and the fourth section examines the determinants of
liquidity in the German government bond market. Section 5 examines to what extent
liquidity and deliverability is priced. A ﬁnal section concludes.
1The spot rates are bootstrapped from actual market yields according to the no-arbitrage principle.
The dashed and the solid line represent the estimated curves for France and Germany, respectively,
and as can be seen from the ﬁgure, the ﬂexibility of the spline becomes important in capturing the
relatively complex shapes of the two term structures. For comparison, we estimated the zero-coupon
curves with another popular method, the extended Nelson-Siegel model. Its functional form however
turned out to be too restrictive for the yiled curves experienced after August 2007.11
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2 The economics of the on-the-run liquidity phenomenon
The empirical observation that bond trading and liquidity concentrate on few issues is
not necessarily surprising. First of all, it is unnecessary to hold (or short) the entire
market portfolio, since a suitable combination of short-, medium-, and long-term bonds
captures almost all the variation in the level and shape of the yield curve [Litterman
and Scheinkman (1991); Bliss (1997)].2,3 Once trading in certain maturities becomes
customary, positive externalities will tend to reinforce it [Pagano (1989)].
The short-, medium-, and long-term bonds that are the most sensitive to yield
curve risk within their maturity segment tend to become benchmark bonds [Yuan
(2005); Dunne, Moore, and Portes (2007)]. Since benchmark bonds tend to be more
liquid [Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991); Higo (1999)] and therefore trade at lower yields
[Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993)], issuers make eﬀorts to ensure that their bond issues
will obtain benchmark status. For example, major sovereign issuers now auction bonds
in accordance with an issuance calendar published in advance. This (shorter-term) pre-
dictability and transparency of issuance schedules contribute to reduced idiosyncratic
price variation in the secondary market by alleviating supply uncertainty. Moreover,
concentration of issuance on a few key maturities allows for larger issue sizes, which
reduce the price impact of large trades. Related, Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) ﬁnd
that idiosyncratic price variation tends to increase with bond age (often referred to as
‘seasonedness’). According to a commonly held view, the relative scarcity of seasoned
bonds increases the price impact of trading. For this reason, the most recently is-
sued bond usually becomes the benchmark, and the ‘benchmark liquidity phenomenon’
becomes indistinguishable from the ‘on-the-run liquidity phenomenon’. In the litera-
ture, researchers commonly use the latter term to describe the positive liquidity eﬀects
(partially) caused by the former. From a theoretical point of view this is mislead-
2This is also supported by the sovereign issuance strategies. For example, most new debt issued by
the G-10 countries has 2-, 5-, or 10-year maturities.
3Hedging or replication of the market return based on three key maturities is common in passive
bond portfolio management, see Dynkin, Gould, Hyman, and Konstantinovsky (2006)].12
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ing because the two phenomena have diﬀerent origins: benchmark bonds are traded by
those who wish to gain or hedge yield curve risk with minimal exposure to idiosyncratic
risk, and on-the-run bonds by those who rebalance their portfolios after government
auctions [Pasquariello and Vega (2009)] or prefer securities trading near par [Eom,
Subrahmanyam, and Uno (1998); Elton and Green (1998)].
Although conceptually distinct, the benchmark and on-the-run liquidity eﬀects are
mutually reinforcing because increased liquidity arising from scale is beneﬁcial to all
traders. Uninformed trading in the market for on-the-run bonds, like hedging or portfo-
lio rebalancing, attracts informed traders who minimize the price impact of their trades
by pooling with the uninformed [Kyle (1985); Chowdhry and Nanda (1991)]. Informed
trading fosters price discovery and improves the hedging eﬀectiveness of the on-the-run
bonds, which, as a consequence, become benchmarks of their maturity segments.
Intermediaries such as market makers are able to oﬀset their exposure to yield curve
risk by short-selling benchmark bonds. Subsequently, however, hedgers have to borrow
benchmark bonds from those who own them to cover the short positions in the cash
market.4 To achieve this, hedgers use the repurchase market where they search for bond
lenders and bargain over the terms of bond loans. In the repurchase market, hedgers’
uninformed demand for benchmark bonds induces bond lenders to increase their supply
which, in turn, makes benchmark bonds easier to locate and reduces search costs [Duﬃe,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2007)]. Vayanos and Weill (2008) show that this virtuous circle
arises because short-sellers are contractually bound to a particular bond, which is the
one that they initially sold short and eventually will have to buy back and deliver
in the repurchase contract. Because of this delivery constraint, market participants
typically ﬁnd it optimal to short the same security as everyone else, i.e. the benchmark
bond. As shown by Duﬃe (1996), superior repurchase-market availability of benchmark
bonds increases their value as collateral, leading to an counterintuitive outcome that
active short-selling may in fact inﬂate cash prices. Yet the very same phenomenon
4Fisher (2002) provides a description of the use of repo markets for bond inventory management.13
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that causes distortions in benchmark prices, namely their repo-market availability, also
facilitates price discovery. This is because informed investors’ ability to implement their
pessimistic beliefs via shorting benchmarks is key to eﬃcient price discovery process
[Diamond and Verrecchia (1987); Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007); Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang (2008)] that, ultimately, warrants the retention of the benchmark status
itself. Figure 3 illustrates this market coordination process that ultimately leads to the
superior liquidity of benchmark on-the-run Treasuries.
Figure 3: On-the-run eﬀect in the cash market for U.S. Treasury securities.
As discussed above, a well-functioning repurchase market is key to cash market
liquidity. On the supply side, market makers are able to lend out bonds and thereby
leverage their capital, hold larger inventories, and provide more depth to the market.
On the demand side, a large and dispersed investor base that ensures active trading
and high liquidity is sustainable only if investors, who want to hedge or speculate
with bonds that they do not already own, can take part in the market. For example,
hedgers who sell and buy back benchmark bonds on a continuous basis increase the
trading volume in the cash market, but are only able to do so using reverse repurchase
contracts.
However, due to the multiplicity of markets and market participants involved in
creating and maintaining liquidity, it is conceivable that multiple equilibria may occur,
some of which may be characterized by low liquidity. Persistent pricing anomalies14
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or market frictions reduce the usefulness of a benchmark for hedging or speculative
purposes. For example, frictions in the repurchase market may force market makers
to deleverage and cut back their liquidity provision in the cash market for including
benchmark bonds. Also, cash market frictions may cause an inﬂationary spiral of
shorting costs whereby investors gradually refrain from short-selling due to its trading
intensive nature, and migrate to futures or swap market to create short positions.5
Consequently, the decline in short selling in response to high shorting costs reduces
cash market liquidity and shifts the locus of price discovery towards alternative markets.
Brandt, Kavajecz, and Underwood (2007) as well as Mizrach and Neely (2008) provide
recent empirical evidence from the U.S. Treasury market.
2.1 The German government bond market
Mainly as a consequence of its relative novelty, the euro-denominated sovereign bond
market is still considerably more fragmented than the U.S. Treasury market. This
fragmentation remains an impediment for the liquidity and informational eﬃciency of
the European market, as order ﬂow is dispersed over a large number of heterogeneous
securities and markets. Consequently, positive externalities that arise when traders
come together in space and time, namely better liquidity and/or price discovery, are
not realized to the same extent as in the homogeneous U.S. Treasury market. The
absence of ‘spontaneous’ liquidity described above leads to need for more ‘artiﬁcial’
liquidity providers in the form of market makers.
Notwithstanding the considerable widening of sovereign spreads in the course of
the ﬁnancial crisis, euro-area yields have converged dramatically relative to the pre-
EMU period. This has created the conditions and the demand for common benchmark
securities that accurately reﬂect the term structure of risk-free euro interest rates. Given
that the benchmark status is gained through competition rather than being conferred,
5Establishing and maintaining a short position requires more trading than a long position because
repurchase contracts are usually very short-term.15
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the multiplicity of sovereign issuers and the growth of euro-denominated swap market
ensure that this implicit deﬁnition of benchmark bonds is ongoing in the euro area.
In practice, 10-year German government bonds have retained their benchmark status
within the euro area, owing to their relative liquidity and credit quality.6 However,
decentralized trading infrastructure in addition to a less well-established repurchase
market increase the costs of taking and reversing short-term positions in the German
cash market, which is why the bulk of trading and a major share of price discovery take
place in the futures market [Bundesbank (2007); Upper and Werner (2007)] .7 As a
consequence, the benchmark status of German government securities may be attributed
to both cash and futures markets: the futures contracts are the main instruments for
hedging and speculating on euro area interest rates, while the cash instruments are
primarily used for asset allocation purposes. This market organization contrasts with
that of the U.S. Treasury market, where cash instruments, i.e. the benchmark on-the-
run bonds, are used uniformly for pricing, positioning, and hedging.
In a futures-driven cash market, bonds that are deliverable for futures contracts
may challenge the benchmark status of the on-the-run securities. This has been shown
to be the case in the Japanese government bond (JGB) market, where the market’s
view of long-term yields is ﬁrst reﬂected in the prices of JGB futures [Singleton (1996);
Miyanoya, Inoue, and Higo (1999)], and then through arbitrage in the price of key
deliverable bond and the rest of the JGBs [Shigemi, Kato, Soejima, and Shimizu (2001)].
Consistent with the arbitrage argument, Shigemi et al. report that the on-the-run and
the key deliverable bond are the most actively traded JGBs in the cash market. In
addition, Singleton (2004) ﬁnds that the key deliverable JGB has the highest sensitivity
to changes in the term structure of all oﬀ-the-run JGBs, which corresponds to the
6Yields on French government BTANs and OATs are occasionally used as reference rates in the
intermediate maturities.
7Bid-ask spreads in the EUREX futures market are approximately ﬁve to ten times smaller than in
the MTS cash market. For comparison, the spreads in the cash and futures market for U.S. Treasuries
are approximately equal.16
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argument by Yuan (2005) that benchmark status depends on securities’ sensitivity to
systematic risk. On the other hand, Singleton’s results from the futures-driven JGB
market contradicts those from the cash-driven U.S. Treasury market, where Brandt
and Kavajecz (2004) ﬁnd that the sensitivity to market risk declines monotonically in
bond seasonedness.
Given the extremely large and liquid futures market for German government se-
curities, one would expect that the relation between the cash and the futures market
resembles that of the Japanese market rather than the U.S. Treasury market. As an
initial assessment of this conjecture, we estimate the market sensitivities of German on-
and oﬀ-the-run bonds as a crude measure of benchmark characteristics, and compare
these sensitivities to those reported by Brandt and Kavajecz (2004). The bond-speciﬁc
sensitivity is measured by the amount of yield variation explained by the three ﬁrst
principal components estimated from the term structure of German bonds. The re-
sults shown in Table 2 indicate that the German oﬀ-the-run bonds, which typically are
the key deliverable bonds, reﬂect to changes in the term structure more precisely than
on-the-run bonds. The exact opposite holds for the U.S. Treasury market, where the
on-the-run bonds are most sensitive to yield curve risk. Overall, the results in Table 2
and the previous studies on the JGB market suggest that the on-the-run bonds would
share the benchmark status with deliverable bonds in the German cash market.
What does the predominance of futures trading in the German market imply for the
emergence of liquidity diﬀerences between bonds? The more diﬀuse benchmark status
(shared among the bonds in the deliverable basket) contrasts with the unambiguous
benchmark status of the on-the-run treasuries, and would suggest that liquidity dif-
ferentials in the futures-driven German bond market ceteris paribus should be smaller
than in U.S. market. Results of Witherspoon (1993) point to a certain threshold level
in the informativeness of cash markets relative to futures markets, above which the
benchmark status of on-the-run securities (and the liquidity eﬀects thereof) is sup-
ported. If the futures market is too dominant with respect to price discovery, it tends17
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Table 2: The explanatory power of the ﬁrst three principal components.
This table presents the percentages of yield variation explained by the three ﬁrst principal
components extracted from the correlation matrix of daily changes in German term structure.
The sample includes observations on on- and oﬀ-the-run bonds in 2-, 5-, and 10-year maturities
for the period January 2006-September 2008. The results for U.S. Treasury securities are from
Brandt and Kavajecz (2004).
Adjusted R2










to hamper the cash market liquidity due to substitution, but may otherwise enhance
the liquidity and price discovery of deliverable bonds through cross-market arbitrage
[Holden (1995)].8
Indirect evidence of cross-market arbitrage can be seen in the Figure 1 in the Intro-
duction. This ﬁgure plots average daily trading volumes for 10-year bonds issued by
the United States, Germany and France. The periods during which the bonds are on-
the-run and deliverable for futures contracts are shaded with darker color. Maturities
where bonds are deliverable, but no longer on-the-run are shaded in a lighter color. As
opposed to 10-year U.S. Treasuries in Figure 1a and French OATs in Figure 1c, German
Bunds in Figure 1b continue to be actively traded well after the six month on-the-run
period and the volume of trading remains high for another year until the bonds are
no longer deliverable for the 10-year futures contract. Indeed, the trading activity of
8Cross-market arbitrage had grown so popular that in 2003 Eurex launched “basis instruments” for
German government bond market, which involve opposite positions in futures and cash markets.18
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oﬀ-the-run Bunds in Figure 1b appears to be governed by deliverability; trading seems
to be less active through the periods of non-deliverability, only to become more intense
again as seasoned Bunds again become deliverable.
A similar volume pattern does not obtain for U.S. Treasury securities, despite the
fact that they are deliverable for the 10-year futures contract traded at the Chicago
Board of Trade. A possible explanation is that the simultaneous price discovery in
cash and futures markets weakens the cross-market lead-lag eﬀect and thereby makes
arbitrage less proﬁtable and trading less worthwhile. Also, the delivery basket for the
U.S. 10-year futures contains considerable more securities than in the German case,
making arbitrage-based trading less observable in individual securities.
To sum up, costly frictions in the cash market for German government bonds would
suggest a diversion of order ﬂow away from the cash instruments and towards futures
contracts. Low transaction costs and the ease of taking short positions in the futures
market attracts both uninformed as well as informed traders. For this reason, German
futures contracts dominate price discovery in euro interest rates over cash bonds.
This is a key diﬀerence from the U.S. Treasury market, where trading in the on-the-
run bonds and futures contracts are complementary with regard to price discovery. As
much an outcome as a cause, the on-the-run U.S. Treasuries are liquid relative to oﬀ-the-
run securities and actively traded for hedging and speculative purposes. In the absence
of such trading, such as for German on-the-run bonds, one would expect the liquidity
diﬀerentials between on- and oﬀ-the-run bonds to be much less pronounced. Indeed,
turnover and the related positive liquidity eﬀects may be even greater for German
oﬀ-the-run bonds, since they are typically the cheapest-to-deliver into the two-, ﬁve-,
and ten-year futures contracts and therefore subject to cross-market arbitrage trading.
Figure 4 illustrates this particular relationship between the German cash and futures
markets.19
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Figure 4: The combined cash and futures market eﬀect in the German market.
3D a t a
As is the case with most government bond markets, the secondary market for German
government bonds is predominantly an over-the-counter market. Trading takes place
mostly between dealers, either using traditional voice brokers and bilateral negotia-
tion, or increasingly through electronic platforms. The source of our data on bond
prices, quoted depth and quoted bid-ask spreads is MTS, the largest electronic trading
venue for German government bonds, see Bundesbank (2007). MTS is a system of
quote-driven platforms with designated market makers who compete for other market
participants’ order ﬂow. Market makers supply liquidity for the bonds assigned to them
by providing two-way proposals of a minimum size for at least ﬁve hours a day.
Our sample extends from January 2006 through September 2008. This period is
particularly suitable for analysing government bond market liquidity as it covers both
the tranquil period before mid-2007 as well as the turbulent period following the onset
of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Overall, our data include approximately ten million quotes and sixty thousand
trades on bonds issued by the Federal Republic of Germany. The quote records include
three best bid and oﬀer quotes with the associated quote sizes at tick-by-tick frequency.
Since quotes on MTS are binding unless withdrawn, the quote records allow us to
obtain reliable estimates of the transaction costs that the market participants face as20
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well as the size of the inventory that is available for immediate trade.9 The transaction
records include prices and quantities with an indicator variable of the direction of
the trade (buy or sell). Every quote and trade entry in our records is identiﬁed by
an individual security identiﬁcation number (ISIN) and a time stamp recorded to the
nearest millisecond. Bond issue sizes are provided by the German Finance Agency.
Despite its signiﬁcant role in electronic trading, the MTS transactions constitute
only a small fraction of the overall trading volume in German government bonds. For
that reason, we supplement our MTS data with trading volume information provided by
International Capital Market Association (ICMA) through Datastream. Analogous to
GovPX in United States, ICMA collects and disseminates data on transactions made by
its members in the over-the-counter markets. Approximately 400 ﬁnancial institutions,
including the largest dealers in German government bond market, report their trades
to ICMA. The sample for traded volumes covers the period January 2002 through
February 2009.
Following the ﬁndings of previous research, and reﬂecting the ﬁrm-quote nature of
our data, we use traded volumes, quoted depths and quoted bid-ask spreads as our
measures of liquidity. The quoted spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between best ask
and bid price and is measured in percent of the midpoint price. The bid-ask spread
alone, however, does not provide any information about the amounts available for
trading at a given time. We therefore also include market depth as a complementary
measure of liquidity. Market depth is proxied by the average volume available for
trading at the best three bid and oﬀer prices.10 Both quoted depths and spreads,
which are observed at the intra-day frequency, are collapsed into representative daily
9To mitigate concerns that quotes are actually not ﬁrm, we compare transaction prices to standing
quotes. We ﬁnd that two thirds of the transactions in our sample are made exactly at the quoted
prices. For the remaining third of the trades, the diﬀerences between quoted prices and transaction
prices were small.
10Since MTS allows large transactions to be executed as iceberg orders, i.e. partially outside the
order book, the market may be actually deeper than the cumulative depth indicates. We do not have
data on the iceberg orders, but MTS reports that their share of all orders is less than two percent.21
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values by taking the median. This is an eﬀective way of removing outliers, which is a
serious problem when using end-of-day (or ‘snapshot’) quotes.
4 Determinants of liquidity in the German bond market
The aim of this section is to empirically assess whether liquidity diﬀerences across Ger-
man government bonds are explicable in terms of deliverability into futures contracts.
For this purpose, we consider four diﬀerent liquidity measures: traded volumes, quoted
depths, quoted bid-ask spreads and the ‘liquidity index’ proposed by Bollen and Whaley
(1998). By constructing an (unbalanced) panel consisting of time-series observations
(on liquidity measures and potential liquidity determinants) for a large cross-section
of bonds, we can separately identify the impact on liquidity of deliverability and ‘on-
the-run’ status. With respect to the impact of deliverability, we distinguish between
‘cheapest-to-deliver’ (CTD) bonds, and bonds which are merely deliverable.11 We con-
trol for multiple other factors which have previously been found to determine liquidity.
The set of control variables includes time to maturity, seasonedness (i.e. bond age) and
issue size. Since our main interest is in the cross-sectional variation in liquidity between
bonds with diﬀerent characteristics, we also include time dummies. Time dummies help
us overcome the potentially important short-coming that the MTS data reﬂect activity
on electronic trading platforms and not the entire market. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that in addition to the general decline in liquidity after July 2007, the market share
of electronic platforms have declined.12 By including time dummies, we minimize the
impact of any trend in market share on our results.
To be more conﬁdent that any deliverability-related liquidity eﬀects we may de-
11Owing to the construction of the so-called conversion factors, during our entire sample, the CTD
bonds are consistently the outstanding bond with shortest remaining time to maturity of the bonds in
the delivery basket.
12As volatility rose precipitously after mid-2007, market participants apparently became increasingly
reluctant to supply liquidity to each other in the form of tradeable buy or sell quotes in limit-order
markets.22
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tect are genuine, we conduct identical analyzes for a control country lacking a futures
market. For this purpose we use France, as the French government bond market is
comparable to the German market in terms of credit rating, currency and amounts
outstanding in the individual bonds. In the following, we analyze the determinants of
traded volumes, quoted depths, quoted bid-ask spreads and the liquidity index.
4.1 Determinants of traded volumes
To assess the determinants of traded volumes, we regress log average daily volume
on time dummies (for each month), deliverability dummies, cheapest-to-deliver dum-
mies, on-the-run dummies, time to maturity (measured in years), seasonedness (also
measured in years) and log issue size.
The deliverability dummies reﬂect the EUREX criteria determining whether a par-
ticular bond is eligible for delivery into the 2, 5 and 10-year German bond futures.
Eligible bonds for these three contracts have remaining maturity in the ranges 1.75-2.25
years, 4.5-5.5 years and 8.5-10.5 years, respectively. This gives rise to three deliverabil-
ity dummies.13 Note that (the compounded value of) the coeﬃcients on these dummies
can be interpreted as the percentage increase in trading volume for bonds belonging to
the particular maturity bracket (relative to bonds in any of the undeliverable maturity
brackets). We also include speciﬁc cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) dummies (one for each
of the 2, 5 and 10-year futures contracts) taking the value one when a given bond is
CTD into the next-to-expire futures contract, and zero otherwise.14
The remaining estimated coeﬃcients also have interesting interpretations. The
coeﬃcient on the on-the-run dummies gauge the impact on trading volumes related to
13A newly issued 10-year bond will ﬁrst be deliverable into the 10-year futures and then experience
a time period where it is not deliverable (from 8.5 to 5.5 years remaining maturity) before it again
becomes deliverable into the 5-year futures, and so on. For maturities below 1.75 years, the bond will
never again become deliverable.
14We use the implied repo rate method to identify the cheapest-to-deliver bonds for each date and
futures contract.23
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a bond being the most recently issued bond of a given original maturity. As mentioned
above, studies on U.S. Treasuries typically ﬁnd very large on-the-run eﬀects on liquidity.
The coeﬃcient on the seasonedness variable can be interpreted as the annual percentage
decay in trading volume as the bond ages. One would expect that trading volume (and
other liquidity measures) decline as a bond ages, because an increasingly large fraction
of the issued amount ends up in buy-and-hold portfolios. By controlling for other
liquidity determinants in a panel setting (in particular deliverability and on-the-run
eﬀects, and developments in overall market liquidity as captured by the time dummies),
we can identify the pace of such decay. Finally, the coeﬃcient on the (log) issue size
provides the elasticity of trading volumes with respect to issued amounts.15
Table 3 displays the results for the determinants of trading volumes for German
bonds, and as a control, for French bonds. We ﬁrst consider the results for Germany.
Lines 2-4 of the table show that the impact of deliverability in all cases have the ex-
pected positive sign, and the coeﬃcients are all highly statistically signiﬁcant. The
estimated eﬀects of deliverability are economically important, as the estimated coeﬃ-
cients between 0.54 and 1.05 correspond to increases in trading volumes between 72%
and 186%.16 The next three lines in the table reveal that a bond tends to experi-
ence an additional boost in trading volumes when it is the cheapest-to-deliver bond.
The (compounded) increases in trading volume for CTD bonds (relative to comparable
non-deliverable bonds) are 148%, 253% and 229% for the 2, 5 and 10-year maturities.17
On the other hand, on-the-run status per se has a somewhat smaller eﬀect, increase
trading by around 100%. Although the on-the-run eﬀect on volumes is positive and
highly statistically signiﬁcant, it is smaller than the eﬀects related to being cheapest-to-
15Lacking a time series of real-time outstanding amounts, we use outstanding amounts at the end of
our sample. This of course ignores changes over time due to tap issues. Therefore we may overstate
somewhat the outstanding amounts in some cases, and thus underestimate the true coeﬃcient.
16The compounded eﬀects are obtained as the exponential of the relevant estimated coeﬃcients minus
one.
17In this case, the compounded eﬀects are obtained as the exponential of the sum of the relevant
estimated coeﬃcients (e.g. 2-year deliverability and 2-year CTD) minus one.24
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Table 3: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French bonds
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jan. 2002 through Feb. 2009 (T=86).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -13.12 (-2.62)*** -13.64 (-2.40)**
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.54 (8.27)*** 0.38 (5.08)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.67 (8.75)*** 0.33 (3.67)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.05 (7.99)*** 0.51 (5.73)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.37 (2.78)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.59 (7.45)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.14 (1.19)
On-the-run status 0.69 (4.88)*** 0.59 (5.96)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.08 (-4.54)*** -0.12 (-7.19)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.02 (-1.79)* 0.01 (1.22)
Log issue size 1.42 (6.64)*** 1.38 (5.79)***
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 02-Feb 09 Jan 02-Feb 09
Number of months 86 86
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 4427 3024
Adjusted-R2 0.73 0.6425
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deliver. This comparatively modest on-the-run eﬀect contrasts with the overwhelming
eﬀect seen in studies using U.S. Treasury data. The decay related to bond aging (sea-
sonedness) is estimated to be around 8% per year. This implies, for example, that an
old 30-year with eight years remaining maturity would attract less than a ﬁfth of the
trading volume of a two-year-old 10-year bond with same remaining maturity and issue
size. Finally, we ﬁnd the elasticity of trading volumes with respect to the amount issued
to be higher than one. This may reﬂect that not only are large issues traded more, the
resulting enhanced liquidity (in terms of depth and expected transaction costs) may
also feed back positively on trading in the bond.
The two rightmost columns of Table 3 display the comparable results for French
government bonds. A ﬁrst thing to note is that all signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have the
same sign as in the German case. Also, all the coeﬃcients of the control variables
have very similar magnitudes. There are, however, notable diﬀerences in the relative
size of the coeﬃcients on the deliverability and on-the-run dummies. In particular, the
dummies for the three maturity brackets considered (corresponding to ‘deliverability’ in
the German case) have coeﬃcients which are below that of the on-the-run dummy. This
considerably smaller ‘deliverability’ eﬀect for French bonds probably reﬂects the absence
of a liquid futures market for French government bonds. It should be noted, though,
that even these hypothetically ‘deliverable’ French bonds tend to trade signiﬁcantly
more than their ‘non-deliverable’ counterparts. A possible explanation is that French
bonds which match the maturity requirements for the German futures also can be
quite accurately hedged with positions in these futures. Moreover, higher cash-market
liquidity for German bonds would make cross-country spread trades cheaper to execute.
Therefore, both direct and indirect liquidity spillovers from the German futures market
into the French cash bond market are conceivable.
Tables 13-14 in Appendix A show the results when the data set is split in pre-crisis
and crisis samples. While the main results remain unchanged, it is notable that the
‘deliverability’ eﬀect French bonds declined in the crisis sample. This may reﬂect that26
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the ability to hedge French bonds with German futures was hampered by the dramatic
increase in the level and variability of the French-German yield spread. Thus liquidity
spillovers to ‘deliverable’ French bonds may well have declined.
As a robustness check, Table 12 (also in Appendix A) displays the corresponding
results for the full-sample panel regressions, but without time dummies. The estimated
coeﬃcients remain virtually unchanged and the 85 dummies add relative little to the
overall explanatory power of the model. This clearly suggests that the inclusion of time
dummies does not drive the results.
4.2 Determinants of quoted depths
Table 4 shows the results of similar panel regressions, but now using quoted debts as
the dependent variable. For the pre-crisis sample (the two leftmost columns), quoted
depths can be broadly explained by time-to-maturity, seasonedness and log issue size.
However, even in this tranquil period, there is evidence that deliverability increases
quoted depths. The eﬀects are however smaller than for traded volumes.
In the crisis sample (from July 2007 to September 2008), the importance of deliv-
erability become more pronounced.18 The amount available for immediate trading at
ﬁrm quotes was thus signiﬁcantly higher for deliverable bonds. This holds for all three
futures contracts considered (2, 5 and 10 years). Interestingly, the status as ’cheapest-
to-deliver’ does not appear to add extra depth in this period. This suggests that it is
the ability to hedge a given bond with a futures contract which matters for liquidity,
rather than the prospects of actual delivery. It is also noteworthy that during the crisis,
on-the-run status became insigniﬁcant for German bonds. Overall, the coeﬃcients for
the remaining controls are quite comparable over the sub-samples: seasonedness and
time-to-maturity have the expected signs and are always highly signiﬁcant. This is in
line with the inventory view, where bonds with a long time to maturity (and thus the
18This is formally conﬁrmed by a joint exclusion test (F-test) for sub-period dummies interacted with
deliverability variables, carried out in regression for the entire sample.27
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high interest rate risk) are less liquid, as are bond which are ‘old’ (because the have in-
creasingly ended up in ‘buy-and-hold’ portfolios). As expected, issue size is important
for depth, although much less so than it was for volumes.
For the control country, France (see Table 15 in Appendix A), in the pre-crisis
sample, ‘deliverability’ had a positive eﬀect on depth, but again less than for Germany.
The ‘on-the-run’ status was again found to be quantitatively more important than
‘deliverability’ for French bonds (in both sub-samples).
4.3 Determinants of quoted bid-ask spreads
Table 5 shows the results for quoted bid-ask spreads. The results for the pre-crisis
period are somewhat puzzling: three of deliverability dummies are signiﬁcant, but
have the wrong sign. On-the-run status, on the other hand, has the right negative
sign (i.e. spreads are tighter for on-the-run issues), although not strongly signiﬁcant.
One possible explanation is that in the pre-crisis sample, market makers had quoting
obligations (i.e. they had to post bid and ask prices which complied with a certain
maximum spread). Our results suggests that these spreads were to a very large extent
determined by bond characteristics such as time to maturity, seasonedness and issue
sizes. Note also that R2 is as high as 0.93 in this case.19
During the crisis sample, where market-maker obligations were suspended most of
the time, the picture changed somewhat. Two of the deliverability dummies become
signiﬁcant, and they also have the expected negative sign. Quantitatively, the estimated
eﬀects on spreads remain rather small, though. This may indicate that for smaller
trade sizes, the distinction between deliverable and non-deliverable bonds may not be
particularly important. Market-makers may be willing to provide liquidity in the form
of relatively tight bid-ask spreads for small amounts also in non-deliverable bonds. It
seems plausible, on the other hand, that if market makers are to provide substantially
liquidity in the form of tight bid-ask spreads for large amounts, the ability to hedge
19Table 16 in Appendix A shows the comparable results for France, which are broadly similar.28
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Table 4: Determinants of quoted depth for German government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily cumulated (log) depth. Asterisks
*, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 4.00 (1.97)** 9.20 (4.60)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.32 (6.51)*** 0.34 (7.89)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.04 (0.68) 0.38 (7.90)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.16 (2.18)** 0.47 (10.10)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future -0.06 (-0.97) -0.06 (-0.94)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.09 (2.67)*** 0.05 (0.67)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.07 (0.94) -0.05 (-1.18)
On-the-run status 0.20 (3.26)*** 0.09 (1.25)
Seasonedness (in years) -0.04 (-4.51)*** -0.05 (-5.24)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.05 (-13.88)*** -0.03 (-10.46)***
Log issue size 0.58 (6.75)*** 0.35 (4.18)***
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 75 75
Number of month-bond obs. 902 748
Adjusted-R2 0.78 0.7129
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with futures likely becomes more important. To better capture both the depth and
spread dimensions of liquidity simultaneously, we ﬁnally consider a ‘liquidity index’
deﬁned as the quoted depth divided by the bid-ask spread.
4.4 Determinants of the liquidity index
The liquidity index is intended to capture the possibility that despite tightly quoted
bid-ask spreads, a market may not necessarily be liquid with respect to execution of
larger trades. Similarly, although quoted depth is a quite informative measure, it does
not take into account the tightness of the market: there may large depth, but if bid
and ask prices are far apart, such a situation would not necessarily correspond to a
liquid market. To ensure the robustness of our ﬁndings against such short-comings of
the one-dimensional liquidity measures, we present in Table 6 the results of the same
regressions as above, but now using the liquidity index as the dependent variable. On
this alternative measure of liquidity, the importance of deliverability clearly rose in the
crisis sample for the 5 and 10-year maturities. In the pre-crisis samples, the liquidity
index could be explained almost most exclusively by time to maturity, seasonedness
and issue size.
Overall, this section has provided three main results. First, the liquidity of German
bonds which were deliverable into the nearest-to-expiry futures contracts were found to
be superior to non-deliverable bonds, when controlling for relevant bond characteristics
such as time to maturity, seasonedness and issue size. Second, the positive impact on
liquidity of belonging to the deliverable maturity intervals was consistently found to be
higher for German bonds than for the control (French bonds), and - consistent with the
more diﬀuse benchmark notion in the German market - the importance of ’on-the-run’
status was found to be correspondingly lower for German bonds. Third, with respect
to the comparison across market regimes, i.e. the pre-crisis versus crisis samples, we
found that the importance of deliverability generally increased in the crisis sample. We
now turn to the question, whether deliverability is also priced into German bond yields,30
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Table 5: Determinants of quoted bid-ask spreads for German government
bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) bid-ask spreads. Asterisks *,
**, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 10.25 (4.42)*** 12.42 (7.41)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.03 (0.55) -0.10 (-2.11)**
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.36 (4.89)*** 0.03 (0.37)
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.25 (3.38)*** -0.12 (-1.66)*
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.26 (2.62)*** 0.41 (2.57)**
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future -0.02 (-0.55) 0.05 (0.43)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future -0.09 (-1.40) -0.12 (-0.66)
On-the-run status -0.25 (-2.36)** -0.25 (-2.31)**
Seasonedness (in years) 0.03 (3.33)*** 0.04 (5.95)***
Time to maturity (in years) 0.09 (16.13)*** 0.09 (18.61)***
Log issue size -0.43 (-4.37)*** -0.52 (-7.32)***
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 75 75
Number of month-bond obs. 846 736
Adjusted-R2 0.93 0.9131
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Table 6: Determinants of liquidity index for German government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) depth divided by bid-ask
spread. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 5.83 (2.83)*** 13.11 (5.71)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.15 (2.79)*** 0.20 (2.87)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.08 (1.06) 0.46 (5.97)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.10 (1.05) 0.57 (6.31)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future -0.33 (-2.94)*** -0.42 (-2.20)**
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.01 (0.34) -0.06 (-0.59)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.09 (1.06) 0.12 (0.83)
On-the-run status 0.30 (2.88)*** 0.25 (1.58)
Seasonedness (in years) -0.05 (-5.43)*** -0.07 (-6.54)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.13 (-21.83)*** -0.13 (-18.33)***
Log issue size 0.84 (9.53)*** 0.52 (5.33)***
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 75 75
Number of month-bond obs. 902 748
Adjusted-R2 0.94 0.9132
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either directly or indirectly through enhanced liquidity.
5 Price eﬀects of liquidity and deliverability
Having established the positive relation between deliverability and a range of liquid-
ity measures for German government securities, we now examine whether liquidity
in general and deliverability in particular are priced. We refrain from using German
non-deliverable bonds as pricing benchmarks since their future deliverability may aﬀect
current prices in the form of liquidity or convenience premium. Instead, we compare the
yields on deliverable and non-deliverable German securities to those of France. Besides
having monetary policy in common, France is, as mentioned above, a natural choice
as a benchmark since the amount of outstanding French debt corresponds to that of
Germany in both absolute and relative (% of GDP) terms. Partly as a consequence, the
diﬀerence in the credit quality are small, which allows us to pin down more precisely
the marginal valuation of liquidity. In addition, France does not have a bond futures
market, and this allows us to identify the impact of deliverability on German bond
yields.
5.1 Variable construction
In order to obtain and easily compare French and German bond yields at diﬀerent
maturities, we estimate continuous zero-coupon yield curves for both countries using
smoothed cubic spline interpolation. Cubic splines have been widely used in the liter-
ature, and this functional form provides enough ﬂexibility to capture local yield eﬀects
that may arise from market segmentation. Once the two curves are estimated from the
cross-section of French and German bond prices, we compute the yield spread between
the two curves at maturities m = {1.0,1.5,...,10.0}, with additional observations at
1.75 and 2.25 year maturities.20 These maturities cover the most relevant part of the
20To ensure that the set of securities used in the estimation procedure is homogenous, the following
types of securities are excluded: securities with ﬂoating rate coupons, securities with remaining maturity33
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yield curve, and the following maturity subsets 1.75−2.25, 4.5−5.5, and 8.5−10.0 that
correspond to the baskets of EUREX German government securities deliverable for 2-,
5-, and 10-year futures contracts, respectively. We calculate these yield diﬀerentials for
each trading day from January 2006 through September 2008.21
We attempt to explain the yield spread across maturities and over time with the
diﬀerence between French and German bond market liquidity and the deliverability
of German securities. To accomplish this, we use the MTS data on French bonds to
compute daily liquidity measures similar to those described in Section 3. Once we have
the necessary liquidity measures for both French and German bonds, we average them
across non-overlapping maturity brackets centered on each maturity m. That is, we use
group averages instead of individual values in order to mitigate individual bond eﬀects
and non-synchronous maturities. The valuation eﬀects of deliverability are captured
by a set of dummy variables that correspond to the ranges of deliverable maturities
speciﬁed in EUREX futures contracts.
In addition to liquidity and deliverability, several recent studies ﬁnd that perceived
diﬀerences in the credit quality of euro-area sovereign issuers have eﬀects on the relative
pricing of their bonds.22 Although we minimize this eﬀect by comparing two sovereign
issuers with similar ﬁscal fundamentals, a market-based measure that is available on
daily basis is nevertheless desirable to capture additional aspects of governments’ per-
ceived credit quality. For this reason, we augment our empirical model of the interest
rate spread with data on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS). 23
less than one year, securities with issue size less than EUR 5 billion, securities issued in non-euro
currencies, securities originating from a coupon-stripping program, securities issued by government
special fund, and inﬂation- or index-linked securities. Moreover, to disentangle the hypothesized price
eﬀect of on-the-run status, the most recently issued securities are excluded as well.
21The ﬁt of the spline function is good for both countries, with the mean absolute ﬁtting error being
less than one basis point.
22See, for instance, Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003); Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht
(2004); Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009); Schuknecht, von Hagen, and Wolswijk (2008)
23A sovereign CDS is contract that allows the investor to hedge against the event that a particular
government defaults on its debt. In exchange for this ‘credit protection’, the investor agrees to make34
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A convenient property of CDS premiums is that they provide more direct reﬂections
of the market’s assessment of sovereign credit risk. This allows us to compute the
credit risk premium on a ﬁve-year German government bond simply by subtracting
the premium paid on a ﬁve-year CDS contract from bond’s par yield. In the case of
non-integer maturities for which the CDS contracts are not traded, we use observed
premiums on nearby contracts to linearly interpolate the missing intermediate ones.
Once the credit risk premium is netted out, we can decompose the residual par yield
into elements associated with risk-free rate, liquidity, and deliverability. Consequently,
French and German spot rates obtained from the spline estimation are transformed
into par yields.
Finally, motivated by the results of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007),
we control for a potential negative relationship between aggregate supply and pricing
of government debt. In particular, we calculate the average sizes of outstanding French
and German bond issues on a daily basis and use their logarithmic diﬀerence to gauge
changes in the relative supply of national debt. We also include year dummies and
time-to-maturity as additional control variables to capture any unobserved factors that
might aﬀect the relative valuation.
Table 7 presents the summary statistics for yield, liquidity, quality, and issue size
diﬀerentials between France and Germany. To facilitate comparison across maturities,
the statistics are categorized by maturity segments that correspond to permanently non-
deliverable maturities as well as 2-, 5-, and 10-year delivery baskets. As shown in Table
7, the diﬀerentials of par yields, bid-ask spreads, and credit risk are consistently positive
across maturities, whereas log issue size diﬀerentials are negative. Taken together, this
imply that investors perceive liquidity and credit quality of French bonds to be slightly
inferior to their German counterparts, and this may explain that the French securities
periodic payments, known as premiums, to the seller of the contract over its life or until the government
defaults. Compiled by Credit Market Analysis Ltd. and provided by Thomson Datastream, our CDS
data is based on daily indicative bid premiums quoted by thirty key market participants for contracts
on French and German government bonds with average residual maturities from one to ten years.35
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command higher yields across the yield curve. Several other results should be noted
from Table 7. In our sample, the average size of French issues is approximately six per
cent smaller than that of German bonds, and the size diﬀerential varies from -12% to
zero. Yet despite the larger stock of debt, German bonds seem to trade at yield levels
that are economically and statistically lower than those required on French securities,
which suggests that the positive liquidity eﬀects associated with larger ﬂoat outweigh
the direct supply eﬀects. In addition, the variables in Table 7 exhibit substantial
variation both in the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions, which motivates the
use of panel estimation techniques.
5.2 Empirical results
To empirically test the conjectured relation between the French-German yield spread
and the factors associated with relative liquidity, quality, and deliverability, we pool our
data in a panel that includes a time series of daily observations from 2 January 2006
to 30 September 2008 for each maturity m. We split the panel into two sub-samples,
using 1 July 2007 as the break to investigate whether the economic importance of our
valuation factors change after the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. To this end, we estimate
the following econometric model both for the pre-crisis period and the crisis period


















t )] + δ(DELm)+λ(Xt,m)+εt,m (1)
where
DELm = {NONDEL<1.75,DEL 1.75−2.25,DEL 4.5−5.5,DEL 8.5−10.5}
Xt,m = {m, year dummies}
and R
i





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t are the credit default swap premium, liquidity measure, and
average issue size, respectively. The liquidity measures are percentage bid-ask spread,
log depth, or the log ratio of depth and spread. We adopt log speciﬁcations in order to be
able to interpret the corresponding regression coeﬃcients as semi-elasticities of the yield
spread. DELm is a vector of dummy variables that represent diﬀerent deliverability
conditions and δ is the corresponding vector of coeﬃcients. In particular, DELm
takes the value of one if maturity m is deliverable for a German futures contract,
that is, it satisﬁes the maturity condition shown in the subscript. NONDEL<1.75 is
one for maturities less than 1.75 years that are permanently non-deliverable. Xt,m
includes other control variables, namely time-to-maturity and year dummies. In all the
regressions, we adjust for both cross-sectional and time eﬀects in residuals εt,m using
the variance estimators suggested by Thompson (2005).24
The estimation results for Equation 1 appear in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 reports the
determinants of the yield spread before the onset the ﬁnancial crisis. The coeﬃcients
for diﬀerent liquidity measures are not statistically diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that
liquidity was not a key concern for the marginal investors in the pre-crisis period. This
result, however, holds only for measures of “artiﬁcial liquidity” (i.e. liquidity provided
by market makers as opposed to endogenously emerging liquidity): the log ratio of
average issue sizes, a measure of relative ﬂoat, loads negatively on the yield spread and
is statistically signiﬁcant. This means that the indirect liquidity beneﬁts arising from
larger issues more than oﬀset the direct supply eﬀects.25
24Thompson (2005) suggests the following variance estimator  Va r( β) for an OLS estimator  β that
is robust to heteroscedasticity and correlation across both distinct maturities m and time t:
 Va r ( β)= Vm +  Vt −  VWhite
where  Vm and  Vt are the estimate variances that cluster by maturity and time [Huber (1967); Rogers
(1983)], respectively, and  VWhite is the usual heteroskedasticity robust OLS variance matrix [White
(1984)].
25Although it has to be emphasized that the economic importance of increased ﬂoat is marginal:
coeﬃcient -0.22 implies that a one standard deviation decrease (-0.04) in the issue size ratio increases
the yield spread by approximately one basis point.38
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Table 8: The determinants of sovereign yield spread: Pre-crisis period
This table contains the results contains the results of least squares regression of Equa-




t,m, the diﬀerence between French(F)a n d







t are the credit default swap premium, liquidity measure (bid-ask
spread, log depth, or the log ratio of depth and spread), and average issue size, re-
spectively. NONDELm and DELm are dummy variables that take the value of one if
maturity m satisﬁes the limits shown in the subscripts. Asterisks *, ** and *** after
robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Daily observations from January 2nd 2006 to
June 29th 2007.
Spread log Depth log
Depth
Spread
Slope t-value Slope t-value Slope t-value















t )† -0.22 (-6.34)*** -0.22 (-6.44)*** -0.22 (-6.35)***
NONDEL<1.75 0.80 (2.30)** 0.97 (2.34)** 0.91 (2.45)**
DEL1.75−2.25 0.83 (5.00)*** 0.74 (4.72)*** 0.77 (5.21)***
DEL4.5−5.5 -0.60 (-1.45) -0.51 (-1.25) -0.55 (-1.41)
DEL8.5−10.5 3.56 (4.24)*** 3.57 (4.22)*** 3.51 (4.20)***
m 0.24 (1.71)* 0.25 (1.74)* 0.25 (1.81)*
Year-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 6133 6133 6133
Adjusted-R2 0.69 0.68 0.69
†The regression coeﬃcient is multiplied by 100.39
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In addition, the deliverability of German bonds appear to be priced, with the con-
venience yield for holding deliverable bonds being the highest in the 10-year segment at
3.5 bps, and less signiﬁcant for 2- and 5-year segments. Positive, albeit small, coeﬃcient
for non-deliverable bonds indicates that deliverable bonds do not lose value once they
drop permanently out of delivery basket, which mutes the importance of deliverability
especially in the 2-year segment. The coeﬃcients for time-to-maturity, all around 0.25,
indicate that the yield spread increases by one basis point for every four-year increment
in residual maturity.
Consistent with economic intuition, we also ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in perceived
credit quality is positively related to the sovereign yield spread.
Table 9 the results based on the crisis period. All statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
have the expected sign and are larger in magnitude than for the pre-crisis sample. This
points to an increased importance of liquidity, quality, and deliverability associated
in times of market stress. For example, positive and negative coeﬃcients for bid-ask
and liquidity index diﬀerentials, respectively, indicate that increased demand for the
relatively more liquid German securities depresses the entire yield curve compared to
the French one. In particular, a positive coeﬃcient of 0.19 for the bid-ask spread
diﬀerential implies that a two standard deviation (7.2 in the crisis sample) increase
in the relative bid-ask spread is associated with 1.4 bps increase in the yield spread
across maturities. Also, the liquidity index, which incorporates both spread and depth
information, is higher for German securities and thereby loads negatively on the yield
spread.
In addition to relative liquidity, the economic importance of relative credit quality
increases in the times of market disturbance. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients
for credit risk diﬀerential triple in the crisis sample, ranging from 0.35 to 0.42. There-
fore, a ten basis point increase in the CDS spread is associated with approximately four
basis point increase in the yield spread.
Consistent with the results in Table 8, the relative issue size is negatively related40
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Table 9: The determinants of French-German yield spread: Post-crisis
period
This table contains the results of the Panel OLS regression of Equation 1. The de-




t,m, the diﬀerence between French(F)a n dG e r m a n ( G)p a r







are the credit default swap premium, liquidity measure (bid-ask spread, log depth, or
the log ratio of depth and spread), and average issue size, respectively. NONDELm
and DELm are dummy variables that take the value of one if maturity m lies in the
maturity range shown in the subscripts. Asterisks *, ** and *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Daily observations from 1 July 2007 to 30 September 2008.
Spread log Depth log
Depth
Spread
Slope t-value Slope t-value Slope t-value















t )† -0.65 (-7.22)*** -0.61 (-6.1)*** -0.69 (-6.88)***
NONDEL<1.75 -2.15 (-3.36)*** -2.19 (-3.91)*** -2.29 (-3.49)***
DEL1.75−2.25 1.67 (3.88)*** 1.56 (3.39)*** 1.75 (3.88)***
DEL4.5−5.5 1.37 (2.91)*** 1.87 (4.45)*** 1.41 (3.43)***
DEL8.5−10.5 6.03 (4.25)*** 5.36 (4.79)*** 5.39 (4.36)***
m 0.39 (1.95)** 0.58 (4.14)*** 0.52 (2.88)***
Year-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 5511 5511 5511
Adjusted-R2 0.75 0.71 0.71
†The regression coeﬃcient is multiplied by 100.41
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to the yield spread in the crisis time as well. However, coeﬃcients from -0.61 to -0.69
are three times larger and suggest that in times of stress, a large ﬂoat (which makes
bonds easier to locate in an OTC market) becomes especially important.
Finally, the deliverability indicators have explanatory power for the yield spread
even after controlling for the liquidity diﬀerential, which suggests that the value of
holding deliverable bonds cannot be completely explained with their superior liquidity
as measured by our liquidity indicators. Again, the convenience yield is largest for the
10-year segment, 5.4 to 6.0 bps depending on the model speciﬁcation. Furthermore, it
should be emphasized that these ﬁgures are over and above the future deliverability
premium, which varies from 2.2 to 2.3 bps, so that the total convenience yield for
10-year deliverables could well be as high as 8.2 bps. For short- and medium-term
deliverable bonds the convenience yields are smaller, but still economically signiﬁcant
at around four basis points. We conjecture that wider and deeper delivery baskets in
the 2- and 5-year segments reduce the convenience yield attached to individual bonds.
The coeﬃcient for time-to-maturity implies that the yield spread in the 10-year segment
is ranges from 4 to 6 bps, ceteris paribus, depending on the liquidity measure used.
In a recent article, Kuipers (2008) ﬁnds similar albeit much smaller deliverability
eﬀects for U.S. Treasury bonds deliverable for 30-year futures contract. Kuipers (2008)
reports a price premium of less than one basis point on a yield basis, which is in gross
terms since the eﬀect of liquidity is not controlled for.
We perform two robustness checks. First, we re-estimate both samples using quan-
tile regression which is less sensitive to distributional assumptions and outliers. In
particular, maximum yield and bid-ask spreads presented in Table 7 are quite high
compared to their sample averages, which raises concerns that the above results are
driven by a few inﬂuential outliers. To address this concern, we model the conditional
median of the independent variables instead of the conditional mean reported in Tables
8 and 9. For brevity, we do not report these results in detail but note that they are
qualitative similar to those presented in the above tables. Therefore, we conclude that42
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extreme observations do not drive our ﬁndings. Second, we address the potential simul-
taneity bias arising from the joint determination of sovereign yield and CDS spreads
by excluding the latter from the regressions. Leaving the CDS diﬀerential out of the
regressions does not change the subsequent results in any signiﬁcant way, suggesting
that out conclusions from Tables 8 and 9 are robust also in that respect.
5.3 Value of on-the-run status
Having established the negative relation between German bond yields and deliverability,
we turn our attention to the most recently issued securities and ask whether the on-the-
run status has pricing relevance beyond deliverability. Our approach is straightforward
and familiar from the work of Elton and Green (1998) and others. We use the spot
curve estimated from the daily prices of German oﬀ-the-run bonds to value a synthetic
bond with a cash ﬂow schedule similar to that of the on-the-run bond. The reference
price is then converted to a yield and subtracted from the actual market yield of the
on-the-run bond. If the resulting yield spread is negative, it means that investors are
willing to accept lower yields for on-the-run securities relative to similar, oﬀ-the-run
securities. Table 10 provides summary statistics on yield spreads for German 2-, 5-,
and 10-year on-the-run securities.
The yield discount attached to the on-the-run status is surprisingly small for Ger-
man government bonds. The mean yield concessions that investors are willing to pay
in order to own on-the-run securities varies from 1.8 bps in the 2-year segment to -1.7
bps in the 10-year segment, where the latter value is not statistically diﬀerent for zero.
Since the reference yields in the 10-year segment are based on the prices of deliver-
able bonds, it can be concluded that investors do not attach additional value to newly
issued 10-year bonds over seasoned 10-year bonds which remain deliverable for the 10-
year futures contracts. In the 2- and 5-year segments, the on-the-run bonds trade at
yields that are 1-2 bps below the oﬀ-the-run curve, but it should be emphasized that
the economic signiﬁcance of on-the-run status appears trivial compared to Japanese or43
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Table 10: Summary statistics on yield discounts associated with German
on-the-run issues
This table reports summary statistics on yield spreads between actual German on-the-
run bonds of various types and reference securities with similar maturity and coupon
rate. Reference yields are estimated from the term structure using cubic splines. All
values are in basis points. Asterisks *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote
values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. Daily observations from 2
January 2006 to 30 September 2008.
Mean t-value Min Max SD
2-year -1.75 (-2.72)*** -15.77 3.84 2.81
5-year -0.67 (-3.25)*** -4.90 4.48 1.36
10-year 1.74 -1.48 -9.54 13.98 3.96
U.S. government bond markets, where yield discounts often are found to be at least an
order of magnitude larger.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant ‘on-the-run liquidity phenomenon’ in the German
government bond market. Once deliverability into futures contracts and other liquid-
ity determinants are properly controlled for, German on-the-run bonds neither enjoy
substantially better liquidity nor trade at an economically signiﬁcant price premium.
In the light of the evidence from the U.S. Treasury market, which documents large
liquidity and pricing eﬀects associated with on-the-run status, this is surprising.
Instead, we ﬁnd clear evidence that the cross-sectional variation in liquidity mea-
sures as well as yields across German government bonds is closely related to their
eligibility for the two, ﬁve and ten-year futures contracts. The yield discounts on de-44
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liverable bonds cannot, however, be fully explained by standard liquidity measures and
may thus be partly related to a premium for liquidity risk.
Our ﬁndings suggests that on-the-run securities play very diﬀerent roles in the Ger-
man and U.S. Treasury market, in particular with respect to hedging and speculation.
In the U.S. market, the benchmark status of the on-the-run securities is indisputable,
whereas this status - and the related superior liquidity - appear to be shared among
multiple bonds in the Germany market. More generally, our empirical ﬁndings high-
lights the role of a liquid futures markets in supporting the liquidity of the underlying
cash market.
Exploiting that our sample covers part of the recent turbulent period in ﬁnancial
markets, we ﬁnd that the economic importance of liquidity and deliverability increased
considerably under severe market stress. Furthermore, our results suggest that the
large price premium observed on German bonds during the crisis (relative to other
large euro area issuers) may partly be explained by signiﬁcant liquidity spillovers from
the very liquid German futures market. The presence of these eﬀects have implications
for studies of euro-area sovereign spreads, which typically are computed relative to
German yields.45
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Appendix
A Summary statistics and additional tables
Table 11 provides summary statistics for the number bonds, their outstanding amounts,
trading volume, and liquidity measures. As for the number of bonds, our sample
includes more on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run bonds in the two-year segment than in other
segments. This reﬂects the tighter issuance cycle in the short end of the yield curve,
as German Finance Agency issues two-year bonds four times a year while ﬁve- and
ten-year bonds are issued semiannually. Nonetheless, the coverage across maturity
and seasonedness ranges is overall quite good, as there are at least ﬁve bonds in each
category.
Yield spreads between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run bonds appear quite modest, even
at the long end of the yield curve. Indeed, the yields for the most recently issued bonds
and their immediate predecessors deviate on average less than two basis points. Bid-ask
spreads generally get wider with remaining time-to-maturity. For instance, the mean
percentage bid-ask spread for the most recently issued 2-year bond is little over two basis
points, compared to 3.4 basis points for the 10-year on-the-run bond. This is consistent
with market-making models based on inventory management, in which competitive
dealers charge wider spreads for securities that have higher price volatility. For bonds
with diﬀerent original but similar residual time-to-maturity, however, the spreads are
roughly the same. For example, the bid-ask spreads for original ﬁve- and ten-year
bonds with approximately three and half years to maturity are virtually identical. The
bid-ask spreads between on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run bonds do not seem to diﬀer in
an economically important way either. This contrasts with the U.S. Treasury market
evidence, where Fleming (2002) reports ﬁve times wider bid-ask spread for oﬀ-the-run
bills and Pasquariello and Vega (2009) two times wider spread for oﬀ-the-run Treasury
bonds. Market depth, while being similar between on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run bonds,
appears to decline with seasonedness.51
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Table 12: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French
bonds: Panel regression without time dummies
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jan. 2002 through Feb. 2009 (T=86).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -11.26 (-2.54)** -13.85 (-2.38)**
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.57 (8.42)*** 0.38 (5.16)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.70 (8.86)*** 0.32 (3.60)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.06 (7.91)*** 0.51 (5.19)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.34 (2.77)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.58 (7.05)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.15 (1.14)
On-the-run status 0.65 (5.15)*** 0.58 (5.70)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.09 (-5.58)*** -0.13 (-7.35)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.02 (-1.72)* 0.01 (1.21)
Log issue size 1.31 (7.00)*** 1.39 (5.66)***
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects No No
Sample Jan 02-Feb 09 Jan 02-Feb 09
Number of months 86 86
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 4427 3024
Adjusted-R2 0.70 0.6053
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Table 13: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French
bonds (pre-Crisis sample)
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jan. 2002 through Jun. 2007 (T=66).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -16.16 (-2.88)*** -11.40 (-1.55)
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.55 (7.50)*** 0.43 (4.33)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.64 (7.02)*** 0.34 (3.29)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.01 (6.70)*** 0.51 (4.98)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.37 (2.60)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.66 (7.85)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.17 (1.32)
On-the-run status 0.67 (4.34)*** 0.54 (5.00)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.06 (-2.88)*** -0.14 (-6.30)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.02 (-1.95)* 0.01 (1.31)
Log issue size 1.55 (6.47)*** 1.29 (4.17)***
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 02-Jun 07 Jan 02-Jun 07
Number of months 66 66
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 3426 2294
Adjusted-R2 0.74 0.6154
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Table 14: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French
bonds (Crisis sample)
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jul. 2007 through Feb. 2009 (T=20).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -5.81 (-1.29) -20.27 (-3.45)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.60 (5.61)*** 0.22 (2.28)**
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.74 (8.43)*** 0.28 (1.94)*
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.07 (8.27)*** 0.45 (3.37)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.36 (1.69)*
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.27 (1.74)*
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.05 (0.43)
On-the-run status 0.69 (3.49)*** 0.73 (5.20)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.11 (-7.40)*** -0.10 (-5.69)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.01 (-0.94) 0.00 (0.25)
Log issue size 1.08 (5.68)*** 1.66 (6.69)***
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jul 07-Feb 09 Jul 07-Feb 09
Number of months 20 20
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 1001 730
Adjusted-R2 0.73 0.7455
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Table 15: Determinants of quoted depth for French government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily cumulated (log) depth. Asterisks
*, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 9.86 (3.85)*** 17.00 (2.98)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.17 (2.73)*** 0.27 (3.35)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 -0.09 (-1.50) -0.07 (-0.63)
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.16 (3.86)*** 0.27 (3.05)***
On-the-run status 0.49 (6.71)*** 0.50 (3.95)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.05 (-7.71)*** -0.05 (-4.38)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.04 (-13.57)*** -0.02 (-4.04)***
Log issue size 0.33 (3.05)*** 0.01 (0.06)
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 51 51
Number of month-bond obs. 668 555
Adjusted-R2 0.81 0.6556
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Table 16: Determinants of quoted bid-ask spreads for French govern-
ment bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) bid-ask spreads. Asterisks *,
**, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 7.50 (2.25)** 6.52 (2.47)**
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.09 (1.70)* -0.08 (-1.22)
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.12 (2.47)** 0.22 (3.93)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.06 (0.98) -0.04 (-0.75)
On-the-run status -0.23 (-3.35)*** -0.44 (-5.72)***
Seasonedness (in years) 0.01 (1.54) 0.01 (1.39)
Time to maturity (in years) 0.08 (14.84)*** 0.08 (15.77)***
Log issue size -0.30 (-2.16)** -0.25 (-2.22)**
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 51 51
Number of month-bond obs. 634 553
Adjusted-R2 0.91 0.8957
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Table 17: Determinants of liquidity index for French government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) depth divided by bid-ask
spread. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 10.53 (4.10)*** 17.57 (3.79)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.13 (2.54)** 0.21 (2.23)**
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 -0.09 (-1.37) -0.31 (-2.54)**
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.01 (0.29) 0.20 (2.25)**
On-the-run status 0.48 (8.09)*** 0.74 (5.74)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.07 (-7.67)*** -0.06 (-4.30)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.12 (-29.79)*** -0.11 (-15.25)***
Log issue size 0.63 (5.77)*** 0.31 (1.59)
Month-ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 51 51
Number of month-bond obs. 668 555
Adjusted-R2 0.96 0.8858
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